Callahan and Communitarianism

For the past few years, most of my university papers have been writing in respects to the social constructivist role in politics and economics. Registering in this class and leading up to Callahan's articles, I was not expecting communitarian ideas (a main tenant of constructivism) would ever enter a discussion that I presumed to be strictly scientific.

I have been pleased and intrigued that constructivism and its philosophical foundations (I.E. communitarianism) have found a legitimate place in the bioethical/biopolitical/biopower debate. I believe that the concepts of constructivism have often been marginalized in various attempts to covet traditional social, political, and economic thoughts.

After reading Callahan's articles, I had some questions of my own about developing bioethics in regards to genomic research. The first is the classic "chicken-or-the-egg" paradox-- in a situation where we have already figured out that most of the genomic "hype" is about promises of future benchmarks, then what should come first; realizing the promises before we debate about the ethics, politics, etc.? Or do we debate the ethics before the discoveries are made? Which scenario plays out best because obviously there will be a framing effect dependent on which is reconciled first, the science or the ethics. Obviously if the science is completed first, then it will heavily frame the ethical debate and visa-versa. Then as a follow-up question, do we have all the information necessary to simultaneously engage in the scientific research as well as ethical discourse. I'm not sure if I know enough to make any conclusions about these questions.

The second question deals with lineage of thought. If bioethics embraces communitarian concepts, does that open a door for reviewing entrenched positivist and empirical natural scientific philosophies? Because if the communitarian approach is accepted, then it would seem to me that science is then subject to review under the larger constructivism philosophical framework. Only accepting the communitarian aspects of constructivism is like balancing a pyramid upside-down. Communitarianism is only a part of a larger constructivist package and the communitarian idea is a pivotal split from the philosophies we are ingrained with. Is science and are scientists ready to be put under that type of scrutiny because it could lead to some very tense conversations (I think?).

The third question, who is the authority on bioethics in genomics, stem cell research, etc.? This will have a huge impact on the larger sociocultural picture as we go down the road of "promises." If and when biotechnology realizes the promises made by genomics companies, it will unveil a vast common denominator. Unlike forms of governments or different religions, the human genome will not be radically different in Nordic countries than in sub-Sahara African countries. Therefore it seems it would be most suitable for there to be a consensus on bioethics versus a fractured bioethical environment where multiple interpretations end up expressing themselves in a large grey spectrum. It's hard to eat a burger too big for its bun.

On another note, I would be honored to enjoy a hoppy Pacific Northwest brew with Dr. Callahan.

Philosophical Underpinnnings of Fortun's Chiasma and related...

As we have discussed Fortun's chiasma concept, I see an important philosophical shift in Fortun's concepts compared to traditional scientific thought. Since the Enlightenment roughly 300 years ago, the scientific community has coveted a positive, objective epistemology-- often omitting the "human factor" by function of our unique mental capacity in which we can "think" ourselves cognitively objective. Unfortunately through psychological research in the last 50-75 years, it has become empircally compelling that we all have unconscious subjective behaviors that we cannot cognitively control-- directly challenging the ability of any human, including the most objective scientists to pursue science impartially. Fortun's, as well as Zwart's article, seem to lend themselves to a shift in epistemological philosophies of the science community. Fortun's chiasma/writing-style and Zwart's use of the autobiography, both highlight the affect the "human x-factor" has on the path of scientific progress and imply an acknowledgment by both authors that intangible subjectiveness is at play in a traditionally thought-to-be objective arena.

In my opinion, this dynamic has been in-process for many years. The Enlightenment challenged many explanations of the Roman Catholic empire in which the theologically-based Catholic propositions were subjectively manipulated to consolidate power. Since the Enlightenment the scientific community has firmly held onto objective priniciples of scientific endeavors, maybe in an attempt to cleanse the system of subjective sociopolitical forces. That was until psychology emerged as a legitimate science in-and-of itself in the last 20-30 years. Now subjectiveness in an objective community has reintroduced itself, not as a political or religous tool, but as an innate biological force empircally researched to the objective standards of post-Enlightenment science. Granted psychology is still a relatively new science and many aspects of psychology remain in debate, but as psychology progresses I think the trend of addressing the "human factor" in science as highlighted in Fortun's and Zwart's readings so far; science will have to shift its traditional philosophical foundations in order to account for uncontrollable, unconscious subjective forces.